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1. Introduction 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy in Russia
will include not only changes in ownership, allocation mechanisms, and
decision-making structures, but also significant enterprise restructuring and
industrial adjustment as enterprises adjust to new economic conditions. Labor
mobility between jobs, occupations, and enterprises will be key to restruc-
turing and adjustment. Obstacles to recent labor mobility stem from the
industrial structure in Russia and raise questions regarding the relationship
between labor market characteristics and adjustment mechanisms.
My examination of the industrial structure leads to three general conclu-
sions. First, after privatization, many enterprises will operate as monop-
sonists in the labor market. Second, in order to effect restructuring and
adjustment, labor will often need to move between industries rather than
simply between enterprises within industries. Finally, adjustment will cause
the share of industrial employment in small firms to increase. The features
of the transition that will shape the dynamics of labor markets are discussed
in section 2. Empirical findings and their implications for three kinds of
labor markets are presented in section 3. Concluding remarks are offered
in section 4.
This paper stems in part from an earlier project based upon the 1989Soviet
Census of Industry which examines the industrial structure of Russia in terms
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enterprise size and industry concentration (Brown, Ickes and Ryterman
1994). We demonstrate that, relative to the United States, Russia has more
medium and large manufacturing enterprises, few extra-large manufactur-
ing enterprises and almost no small manufacturing enterprises. While few
Russian enterprises are monopolists at the national level, many enterprises
operate in highly segmented markets and are thus able to exercise market
power. This paper extends the analysis to labor markets. While enterprises
will lose their monopoly power as distribution improves, low labor mo-
bility and small labor markets will allow many firms to remain monopsonists
in their labor markets, thus creating barriers to adjustment.
2. Russian Labor Market in Transition 
Labor is highly immobile in Russia relative to western market econo-
mies. The Soviet legacy of internal passports and legal restrictions that pro-
hibited people from moving has had a significant impact on people's habits
and expectations concerning mobility. The Soviet legacy of utilizing
reciprocity or social networks, for meeting many of their household needs
remains. Russians are reluctant to changejobs if the move jeopardizes their
social networks. Rose (1993) utilizes recent survey evidence from three
transitional economies, including Russia, to document nine types of econ-
omies that exist for the production or exchange of goods and services. Four
are social or non-monetized economies that depend upon reciprocal rela-
tionships between people in the same locality or enterprise. In Russia, for
example, 96% of the respondents reported involvement in at least one of
the social economies (more than one quarter regularly rely on help from
friends and relatives; more than one-third reported that they use connec-
tions to provide or receive goods without cash payment). ' 
The Soviet legacy of housing and transportation shortages also impedes
labor mobility. Privatizing residential units may alleviate this problem, but
construction of new housing is also required. The poor system of transpor-
tation is an impediment to households wishing to move their belongings;
transport difficulties makes visiting family and friends in other cities and,
even commuting to work in nearby localities, an obstacle. The information
constraint to labor mobility is declining as advertising and yellow pages-
type publications emerge.
Changes in ownership and decision-making structures of workplaces will
influence the Russian labor market. First, there will be intra-industry ad-
justment as firms identify and exploit their comparative advantage (Ickes
and Ryterman 1993). Firms investing in new technologies and equipment
and thus altering their labor requirements will cause movements of labor
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between firms within industries. Inter-industry adjustment, for example,
growth in the service sector of the economy relative to manufacturing will
impact on the labor market as will the shift in relative output shares be-
tween heavy industries and consumer goods. Finally, as a market economy
emerges in Russia, we would expect an adjustment in the size distribution
of$rrns, resulting in a greater proportion of the workforce employed by
smaller firms.
Table 1 illustrates the difference in the size distribution of civilian
manufacturing enterprises in Russia and the United States. Almost 88%
of U.S. firms employ fewer than 50 people while only 10% of Russian enter-
prises fall in this category. U.S. firms with fewer than 250 workers em-
ploy 27% of the industrial workforce, while those in Russia employ less
than 6 % . Small firms are often the source of innovation. Yet, a significant
percentage of small firms fail. As Russia becomes a market economy, entry
of new, small firms increase responsiveness to consumer commands and
increase the likelihood of innovation.
3. Findings and Implications 
How does the impact of the transition on industrial structure in Russia
influence local labor markets, regional labor markets, and employment in
small and large firms?
Local Labor Markets 
Table 2 documents the number of enterprises or industries by city. Almost
half of Russian cities are one-company towns; 76% of the cities have four or
fewer companies; 92% have 10or fewer. The Soviet legacy of monopsony
continues to dominate industrial employment alternatives. This situation is
compounded by restricted labor mobility. If enterprises in the Military Indus-
trial Complex (MIC) were included, the number would be even more dramatic.
In practice, the results of monopsony power in the labor market will de-
pend on the degree of control-de facto through share ownership or dejure
through political power-the local government has over the decision mak-
ing of the enterprise. Enterprise overstaffing in Russia implies that level
of employment at the time of privatization is even higher than the competi-
tive level. Thus, privatization could lead to high unemployment in one-
company towns.
If workers form unions to bargain over wages and employment, they may
improve their position. The outcome will depend upon whether the workers
form a union before or after labor shedding occurs and whether the union
TABLE 1 
Compar i son  o f  t h e  Size D is t r i bu t ion  o f  Russ ian  a n d  U.S. Manufac tu r ing  F i r m s  
(size c lass  b y  emp loyment )  
Small Medium Large Ex-Large 
Country Statistic 1-49 50-99 100-249 1-249 250-999 1000-9999 10000 or more Total 
Russia Number of firms 2,130 2,476 4,459 9,065 5,662 2,386 83 17,196 
As a percent of total 
number of firms 
in manufacturing 12.4 14.4 25.9 52.7 32.9 13.9 0.5 100.0 
US.  Number of firms 269,516 18,661 11,489 299,666 5,530 1,657 267 307,120 
As a percent of total m 
number of firms n 
in manufacturing 87.8 6.1 3.7 97.6 1.8 0.5 0.1 100.0 8 
z 
Russia Number of workers 57,669 180,815 736,237 974,721 2,874,640 5,911,370 1,758,320 11,519,051 
As a percent of total 
number of workers 
in manufacturing firms 0.5 1.6 6.4 8.5 25.0 51.3 15.3 100.0 
U.S. Number of workers 2,738,564 1,289,853 1,749,175 5,777,592 2,519,572 4,518,667 8,632,159 21,447,990 
As a percent of total 
number of workers 
in manufacturing firms 12.8 6.0 8.2 26.9 11.7 21.1 40.2 100.0 
Source: US.  data from US. Census, 1987 Enterprise Statistics (company data); Russian data from PlanEcon, 1989 Soviet Census of Industry 
(enterprise data). The Russian data do not include enerprises in the Military Industrial Complex. As the vast majority of these enterprises are 
medium and large, their absence does not change the analysis. This table relates statistics only on the manufacturing industries from the Russian 
industry data. 
TABLE 2 
Character is t ics  o f  F i r m s  in Russian Ci t ies by F i r m  a n d  lndus t ry  Concen t ra t ion  
Value of Statistic for Cities with the Following Number of Firms 
Attribute Statistic 1 2 3 4 5-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 >200 Total 
Number of Total Cities 
Percent of Total Cities 
Number of Total Firms 
Percent of Total Firms 
Employment by Firms 
(number) 












Value of Statistic for Cities with the Following Number of Industries 
Attribute Statistic 1 2 3 4 5-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 
Number of Total Cities 
Percent of Total Cities 
Number of Total Firms 
Percent of Total Firms 
Employment by Firms 
(number) 













>200 Total V) 
Source: PlanEcon, 1989 Soviet Census of Industry (civilian) 
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represents all workers in the community or is limited to the workers in an
enterprise. Even without a union or collective, workers may be able to
respond to the monopsony power by exercising control afforded them
through share ownership as a result of privatization.
The union and worker-ownershipoption raise two related concerns. First,
unions or worker-ownership may slow the restructuring process if short-
term concessions are granted at the expense of necessary investments for
profitability in the long run. Second, a high priority to job security could
deter improvementsof labor mobility. Encouraging labor immobility could
adversely affect long-term profitability.
Regional Labor Markets 
Table 3 illustrates the Russian employment situationby industrial branches
and by region. Likely trouble spots are indicated in the table by boxes in
which both numbers are high, meaning that not only is the branch very
important to the region, but also that the region is very important to the
branch. See for example the lumber branch in the North Region: lumber
accounts for 26.1 % of industrial employment in the North, and this region
accounts for 19.2%of total employment in lumber industries. Table 3, which
excludes MIC industries, suggests that branches are evenly distributed across
regions, thus a branch-specific negative shock is less likely to fall dispropor-
tionately on one region. This is good news for regional labor markets, es-
pecially if intra-industry adjustment causes labor to move inter-industry.
Such labor mobility depends on the skill complementarities of jobs and oc-
cupations between industries: if industry-specific skills dominate, inter-
industry mobility will require retraining.
Table 4 identifies the variation across regions of industrial concentra-
tion. In the North Region, for example, regional monopolies-one enter-
prise in that industry in that region-characterize 38.2% of all industries,
and account for 4.7% of civilian industrial enterprises, employing 19.6%
of civilian industrial workforce. Industries with four or fewer enterprises
account for 68.4%of all industries, 14.2%of civilian industrial enterprises,
and 36.9% of civilian industrial employment. In the Central Region, on
the other hand, regional monopolies account for only 1.7%of civilian in-
dustrial employment.
Regional concentration translates into market power. As the only sup-
plier in the region, monopolists survive during transition, insulating their
workers against job loss. If regional concentration diminishes and firms
fail, workers must move out of their region, move to another industry, or
face permanent unemployment.
TABLE 3 
Concentration of Employment in Branches Across Regions for Enterprises in Russia 
(row%/column%) 
Region 
Eastern North Volgo- Western Share of 
Branch Central Chernozem Siberia Far East Kaliningrad Caucasus North Northwest Urals Volga Vyatka Siberia Total E 
Agriculture* 10.910.8 3.3H.1 6.911.9 18.817.1 8.7123.7 4.510.9 17.015.6 2.610.8 10.211.1 5.710.8 5.811.5 5.310.9 1.6 
Apparel 29.514.7 4.U3.2 3.912.5 3.613.1 0.512.9 13.715.9 2.411.8 6.814.9 10.712.7 10.313.5 7.614.4 6.812.7 3.8 
Chemicals 21.614.5 5.915.8 5.514.5 0.911.0 0.010.2 7.714.3 1.411.4 4.614.3 13.014.3 19.518.5 9.417.1 10.515.5 4.9 
Construction' 16.810.1 4.210.1 3.810.1 4.110.1 0.610.1 3.010.0 14.310.4 6.010.1 8.210.1 4.110.0 3.510.1 31.310.4 0.1 
Electronics 24.113.3 9.516.1 4.112.2 1.210.9 1.015.4 6.512.4 0.110.0 8.615.3 13.312.9 9.312.7 11.615.8 10.613.7 3.2 
Fabricated Metal 21.612.6 7.U4.0 3.911.9 3.212.0 0.010.0 10.113.2 0.910.5 12.416.6 15.412.9 922 .3  9.414.0 6.812.0 2.8 
Food 17.317.1 8.8H6.9 4.717.6 8.7119.3 0.8112.8 14.5115.9 3.817.4 4.618.4 10.516.7 11.319.7 5.317.9 9.619.8 9.6 
Furniture 25.111.8 3.611.2 5.111.4 3.711.4 0.812.1 17.613.4 3.3H.1 8.112.6 8.410.9 9.OH.4 6.611.7 8.811.6 1.7 
Ind M&E 27,3115.8 6.7118.2 2.816.4 1.614.9 0.418.2 10.5116.3 2.115.8 5.9115.3 15.5114.1 13.4116.3 5.4111.3 8.4112.2 13.6 
Instruments 43.013.7 1.810.7 1.710.6 0.510.2 0.6H.9 8.812.0 0.110.0 8.513.3 8.911.2 14.312.6 6.211.9 5.711.2 2.0 
Leather 25.611.8 5.611.9 2.610.8 2.310.9 0.411.2 13.312.6 1.010.3 9.313.0 13.811.6 11.611.8 8.412.2 6.011.1 1.7 
Lumber 11.713.4 0.911.3 16.7119.1 8.1112.6 0.313.7 2.612.0 19.2l26.1 4.515.9 14.616.6 4.412.7 7.718.0 9.U6.6 6.8 
Mining* 6.812.3 3.415.4 95112.8 7.6114.1 0.2l3.0 11.4110.5 10.6H7.1 2.213.4 18.319.9 3.712.6 0.811.0 25.6122.1 8.0 
Miscellaneous 37.112.1 2.210.6 2.110.5 1.010.3 0.010.0 10.311.5 4.1H.1 10.012.5 11.411.0 4.510.5 14.212.8 3.110.4 1.3 

TABLE 4 
Measures of Industrial Concentration Across Regions in Russia 
Firm-Industries* Firm-Industries' 
Region Statistic 1 < = 4  Region Statistic 1 < = 4  
Central 010 of Industries 19.0 48.4 North 010 of Industries 38.2 68.4 
010 of Firms 1.4 7.5 010 of Firms 4.7 14.2 
19.6 36.9 
n 
010 of Employment 1.7 16.9 010 of Employment rn 
0 
Chernozem % of Industries 38.8 71.3 Northwest 010 of Industries 37.9 77.2 
010 of Firms 5.9 19.1 % of Firms 8.5 30.9 
S 
010 of Employment 15.5 49.0 010 of Employment 17.4 52.0 
? 
E. Siberia 010 of Industries 40.1 73.1 Urals 010 of Industries 27.1 61 .O 
5m 
0 
010 of Firms 4.6 15.1 010 of Firms 3.0 13.2 a 
010 of Employment 10.7 36.7 010 of Employment 8.2 29.5 B h
a 
Far East 010 of Industries 42.1 70.1 Volga 010 of Industries 27.6 63.6 x rn 
010 of Firms 5.5 15.0 010 of Firms 3.0 14.1 I 
V) 
010 of Employment 12.4 24.3 010 of Employment 7.3 41.1 - z 
Kaliningrad 010 of Industries 62.1 84.8 V-Vyatka % of Industries 38.6 71.1 c a
010 of Firms 27.0 52.6 010 of Firms 5.3 16.6 cn 
010 of Employment 26.3 70.5 010 of Employment 15.1 52.5 v, D 
N. Caucasus 010 of Industries 33.1 65.7 W. Siberia 010 of Industries 32.2 65.2 
010 of Firms 3.9 14.1 010 of Firms 3.7 13.9 
010 of Employment 8.9 25.3 010 of Employment 6.5 29.5 
Source: PlanEcon, 1989 Soviet Census of Industry (civilian) 
'Column lists the value of the statistic for industries with the given number of firms in that industry in that region. Industries are measured A 
at the 4-digit SIC level. ul 
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Employment in Small and Large Firms 
Conventional wisdom suggests that transition will increase the share of
industrial employment in small firms. Small firms are likely privately owned
new entrants, while large firms are likely to be recently privatized
(employee-owned) or state-owned.
In market economies, large firms are typically associated with greater
job security than small firms (Brown, Hamilton and Medoff 1990). Small
firms have higher mortality rates and account for more layoffs. In the
Russian transition economy, as the structure of industry adjusts, there will
be a net job gain in small firms despite high turnover rates of new private
firms. Also, as the large privatized enterprises restructure, they will ac-
count for a large share of layoffs.
Large U.S. firms compensate their employees better than small firms:
these firms pay a 10-15 % wage premium and provide workers much more
generous benefits packages. In Russia, firm size does not explain differen-
tials in wages or benefits (Commander 1993, Standing 1992, Commander
and Jackman 1993). Firm ownership may be a significant explanatory vari-
able. Privatized firms are shedding housing and other services which they
provided as a state-owned enterprise. Currently, there is no clear signal
regarding the relative provision of benefits between small and large firms
in Russia, nor is there any clear signal regarding the quality of working
conditions across firm size or firm ownership.
From the workers' perspective, small private firms might be viewed as
risky because of their potentially higher exit rate. If workers perceive differ-
ences in wages and the quality of working conditions as insignificant, they
will be reluctant to make the moves necessary for industry adjustment. The
question is whether workers perceive these differences.
4. Conclusion 
This paper suggests that several features of the Soviet economy continue
to contribute to the immobility of workers in the Russian labor market.
Privatization will not immediately alter enterprises' monopsonist position
in the relevant labor market. Movement of labor between industries rather
than just between firms within industries will be required for the transition
to a market economy to succeed. Once the transition is complete, a larger
share of industrial workers will be employed in small firms. More research
is needed on the nature of skill and job complementarities within and be-
tween industries and how this will impact restructuring and adjustment.
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Notes 
1. Rose concludes, ". . . about four-fifths of East Europeans are unwilling to
move to another city or country in search of a job. To move cities or change coun-
tries means abandoning the social network that makes it possible to sustain a port-
folio of economies critical in getting by."
2. Jan Svejnar pointed out that joint ventures with Western companies, which
are likely to be small firms, are probably perceived as the best paying and most
secure employment. This is true, but I would argue that workers are very aware
of joint venture status and probably consider these firms in a separate category.
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